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WHO NEEDS EVIDENCE RULES, ANYWAY?
Stephan Landsman*
I. EVIDENCE RULES AND ADVERSARIAL ExcEss
Americans seem wedded to an adversarial way of doing business.
Competition and contest are deeply ingrained in our culture. Not sur-
prisingly, ours are among the most adversarial courts in the world. This
continues to be true despite almost 100 years of anti-adversarial agitation
by reformers like Roscoe Pound,1 Jerome Frank,2 Warren Burger3 and
Marvin Frankel,4 all of whom have decried our "sporting theory of jus-
tice"5 and our contentious courtroom pyrotechnics. We remain commit-
ted to a process that leaves it to the parties to decide, in light of their
adversarial advantage, what proofs to adduce and what challenges to
make to proofs offered by opponents.
One assumption our court system makes is that reliance on an ad-
versarial approach to the gathering and presentation of testimony neces-
sitates evidentiary restraints in order to avoid nasty, brutish and
ultimately unfair contests. Events of the last few months provide some
powerful evidence that this assumption has merit and that the absence of
rules of evidence is likely to result in an unsatisfactory free-for-all. Per-
haps the clearest example of what an adversarial inquiry looks like when
no evidentiary rules apply is the United States Senate's recently con-
cluded hearing concerning the sexual harassment allegations made by
Professor Anita Hill against Supreme Court nominee6 Clarence Thomas.
In the Hill/Thomas case partisan politicians turned a legislative
hearing into an adversarial contest to determine the fitness of Judge
Thomas to sit on the Supreme Court. In their zeal to win, each side used
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University;
B.A., 1969, Kenyon College; J.D., 1972, Harvard University.
1. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964).
2. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949).
3. See Warren Berger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, Ad-
dress at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Adminis-
tration of Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976) in 70 F.R.D. 79, 83-96 (1976).
4. See MARVIN FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980).
5. See Pound, supra note 1, 35 F.R.D. at 281.
6. Clarence Thomas was eventually confirmed by a 52-48 vote of the United States Sen-
ate on October 15, 1991.
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whatever came to hand. The result was the most scabrous public hearing
in recent memory.
Troubling hearsay evidence was dragged in at almost every turn in
the proceedings. Early in the interrogation of Anita Hill, Senator Arlen
Spector quoted from and made extensive reference to the affidavit of a
man named John Doggett III, who claimed that Professor Hill was prone
to fantasize about romantic involvements with prominent male acquaint-
ances.7 Doggett's words were used without the benefit of his live testi-
mony or any immediate opportunity for cross-examination. 8 Adopting a
similar tactic, Senator Alan Simpson made veiled references to letters he
said he had received detailing Professor Hill's unsavory sexual proclivi-
ties.9 The letter writers were never even identified, let alone produced for
interrogation. '0 Hearsay was again the order of the day when Senator
Orrin Hatch sought, without the help of witnesses, to incorporate the
theories of Juan Williams into the proceedings. Williams, a columnist
for the Washington Post, had written an article concerning the allegedly
improper conduct of certain Democratic senatorial staff members in con-
ducting their investigations regarding Judge Thomas."I What was most
distressing about all these incidents, and a number of others as well, was
that the pitfalls attendant to the use of hearsay were ignored in the head-
long rush to produce material to serve partisan objectives.
Unsupported or otherwise dubious opinions were also produced in
great abundance at the hearing. Anita Hill began the parade of such
claims by asserting with little apparent support that it was sexual harass-
ment that led to her hospitalization for gastrointestinal problems in Feb-
ruary of 1983.12 Both Clarence Thomas and a sympathetic senator
advanced the uncorroborated claim that sexual harassers operating in the
workplace generally carry out extended campaigns of offensive conduct
involving a series of victims rather than engaging in isolated acts of har-
assment. 3 Finally, a character witness for Judge Thomas, J.C. Alvarez,
7. Richard L. Berke, Court Nominee Rejects Charges Against Him Before Committee,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1991, at A9.
8. It should be noted that Doggett did eventually testify before the committee.
9. Berke, supra note 7, at A10.
10. Senator Simpson's performance recalls the behavior of Senator Joseph McCarthy in
February of 1950, when he charged that there were a substantial number of communists in the
State Department. "When senators repeatedly challenged him for specifics, McCarthy relied
on innuendo, vague associations, and long-disproven allegations ... ." STANLEY KUTLER,
THE AMERICAN INQUISITION 190 (1982).
11. Excerpts From Senate Hearings on the Thomas Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
1991, at Al 1-12 [hereinafter Excerpts].
12. Berke, supra note 7, at A9.
13. Excerpts, supra note 11, at All.
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propounded the opinion, based apparently on her experience as a victim
of harassment, that Anita Hill's behavior was inconsistent with the con-
duct of a true target of sexual harassment.14 All these opinions cried out
for substantiation, though none was provided in any of the cases.
Character evidence of the most doubtful sort was bandied about
throughout the proceedings. Both Judge Thomas and one of his wit-
nesses were permitted to opine that Anita Hill was not the "meek, inno-
cent, shy Baptist girl from the South" she depicted herself as being.15
Another witness for the judge provided the committee with views about
the judge's character couched in the most unorthodox and ambiguous
form. She argued:
A smart man concerned about making a contribution to
this country as a public official, recognizing the gravity and
weightiness of his responsibilities and public trust, a role model
and mentor who would by his life and work show the possibili-
ties in America for all citizens given opportunity-well, such a
person such as this, Judge Clarence Thomas, would never, ever
make a parallel career in harassment, ask that it not be revealed
and expect to have and keep his real career. And I know he did
no such thing .... 16
On top of all this a mass of evidence of highly questionable relevance
was paraded before the committee. Professor Hill's supporters filed a
report concerning a polygraph test that she had allegedly passed.1 7 This
was injected into the proceedings despite the inadmissibility of such
materials in most sorts of hearings and without any real foundation to
demonstrate its value to the inquiry. Similarly questionable material was
propounded by Senator Hatch who trumpeted passages from William
Blatty's The Exorcist18 and the decision in Carter v. Sedgwick County 19
as sources from which parts of Anita Hill's testimony might have been
drawn. These claims were never substantiated or tied to the proceedings
in any concrete way.
The disgust felt by many Americans concerning the Hill/Thomas
inquiry was undoubtedly the result of a number of different factors in-
cluding the Senate's original insensitivity to charges of sexual harass-
14. Id.
15. Id. at A13; Questions to Those Who Corroborated Hill Account, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
1991, at A15.
16. Excerpts, supra note 11, at A15.
17. Id. at A10.
18. WILLIAM BLATTY, THE EXORCIST (1971).
19. 705 F. Supp. 1474 (D. Kan. 1988).
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ment, the grotesquely partisan behavior of senators on both sides, and
the willingness of many involved in the process to use the cheapest sort of
demagogic tricks. But added to all this was the abysmal quality of the
evidence presented. The seamiest proofs were constantly propounded,
the most dubious opinions were repeatedly trumpeted, and materials of
the most minuscule probative value were regularly relied upon, all in dis-
regard of the evidentiary principles Americans have come to see as em-
blematic of our notions of fair play. The rules of evidence matter if for
no other reason than that they help to deter this sort of shameful
spectacle.
II. THE RULES AS A BAROMETER OF BIAS
The application of evidentiary prescriptions like those contained in
the Federal Rules of Evidence is not a sure-fire guarantee of fair trials.
The rules may be twisted, distorted, manipulated or ignored to produce
results that reflect the deep-seated biases of those applying them. As is
the case with rules of procedure in general,2" evidentiary regulations rely,
to a substantial degree, on judicial discretion in their application.21 The
availability of substantial discretion leaves ample room for improper be-
havior by the trial judge. This problem is compounded by appellate doc-
trines like harmless error that facilitate the turning of a blind eye to
violations of evidentiary law.22 America's courts have all too frequently
manipulated notions of discretion and harmless error so that, as Justice
William 0. Douglas said of the Sacco and Vanzetti case: "The game was
played according to the rules. But the rules were used to perpetuate an
awful injustice."23
Yet even in cases where judges misbehave and appellate courts re-
fuse to intervene, the rules of evidence may prove important. The way
the rules are applied may provide a means of assessing the evenhanded-
ness of the proceedings and, hence, a substantial basis for criticizing offi-
20. See Maurice Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173,
174 (1978).
21. See Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74
IOWA L. REv. 413, 413 (1989); see also FED. R. EvID. 103(a) ("Error may not be predicated
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of a party is affected
22. See Vilija Biliasis, Harmless Error: Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct, 74 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 457,459 (1983); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA.
L. REv. 988, 1028 (1973).
23. William 0. Douglas, The Sacco-Vanzetti Case-Some Forty Years Later, in 1 THE
SACCO-VANZETTI CASE: TRANSCRIPT OF THE RECORD OF THE TRIAL OF NICOLA SACCO
AND BARTOLOMEO VANZETTI IN THE COURTS OF MASSACHUSETTS AND SUBSEQUENT PRO-
CEEDINGS 1920-27, at XV [hereinafter TRANSCRIPT].
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cial action.'A careful examination of a judge's evidentiary rulings will
frequently provide the most clear-cut measure of his or her bias. The
rules in this way create a context in which the overall integrity of a trial
may be ascertained. This is not to say that rules of evidence will always
expose judges engaged in partisan manipulation, or unfailingly reveal ju-
dicial animosity, but rather that such rules will, in many cases, provide
solid proof of prejudice.
A useful illustration of evidence rules' ability to provide a barometer
of bias is provided by the Sacco and Vanzetti case.24 In that 1921 crimi-
nal prosecution, two Italian immigrant anarchists were accused of having
committed a double murder while robbing a shoe company in South
Braintree, Massachusetts, of its $15,000 payroll.25 As part of its case-in-
chief the government offered the testimony of Carlos Goodridge, a sales-
man, who stated that on the day of the robbery he heard shots while
playing pool in Magazu's poolroom on Pearl Street in South Braintree.
He stepped outside to investigate and claimed that he saw the defendant,
Sacco, ride by in the robbers' getaway car.26 This was important testi-
mony because Goodridge was one of perhaps two or three witnesses who
could reasonably claim to have had even a decent glimpse of Sacco.27 On
cross-examination Vanzetti's counsel, Jeremiah McAnarney, asked if
Goodridge were a defendant in a criminal case. The following discussion
then ensued between McAnarney and the trial judge, Webster Thayer:
The Court. That is not a competent question.
Mr. McAnarney. I think it would be if he was.
The Court. Oh, no. A man that has been convicted, then
you can use that record-
Mr. McAnarney. If your Honor please-
The Court. -but not until. You don't mean, do you,
before a man has had a trial, you are going to use that as evi-
dence of guilt?
Mr. McAnarney. If your Honor please, I think I would be
entitled if the man is before the criminal side of this court and is
24. Commonwealth v. Sacco, 151 N.E. 839 (Mass. 1926).
25. For factual descriptions and analyses of the Sacco and Vanzetti case see FELIX
FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI (1961); G. LOUIS JOUGHIN & EDMUND
M. MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO & VANZEITI (1948); FRANCIS RUSSELL, SACCO &
VANZETTI: THE CASE RESOLVED (1986); FRANCIS RUSSELL, TRAGEDY IN DEDHAM (1962)
[hereinafter RUSSELL, TRAGEDY IN DEDHAM]; WILLIAM YOUNG & DAVID E. KAISER, POST-
MORTEM: NEW EVIDENCE IN THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI (1985).
26. Sacco, 151 N.E. at 851.
27. See JOUGHIN & MORGAN, supra note 25, at 77-81.
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now testifying on behalf of the Commonwealth, I would be en-
titled to show it.
The Court. I should exclude it.
Mr. McAnarney. Your Honor will save me an exception.
The Court. Certainly.
Mr. Moore. An exception for the defendant Sacco.
The Court. There is no difference between witnesses,
whether they appear for the Commonwealth or for the defend-
ant. The law is the same for all witnesses, and you can't attack
any witness's credibility except by showing a record of convic-
tion, and the record of conviction means a sentence, a judgment
pronounced by the court, and until there has been a judgment
pronounced by the court, the evidence is not competent.
Therefore, I exclude it.28
The propriety of this ruling was certainly open to question, espe-
cially in light of the facts that Goodridge was on probation due to a plea
in the case referred to by Mr. McAnarney, and was clearly vulnerable to
government pressure to testify in a way that would benefit the prosecu-
tion's case.29 Yet, standing alone, this bit of interrogation and eviden-
tiary ruling might not mean too much, especially because of the great
length of the trial and the large number of witnesses involved.3"
What makes Judge Thayer's tightly constrained evidence ruling
with respect to Goodridge revealing is how, despite the judge's often pro-
claimed evenhandedness, 31 it starkly contrasts with the latitude permit-
ted the prosecution when the two defendants, most particularly Sacco,
took the stand. After Sacco testified in his own behalf he was cross-ex-
amined for two days by prosecutor Frederick Katzmann. This interroga-
tion stretches to almost 100 pages of closely printed transcript.32
Katzmann began his questioning by asking about Sacco's decision to
28. 1 TRANSCRIPT, supra note 23, at 546-47.
29. In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), the Supreme Court identified such pressures
as a significant potential cause of bias. The Court held that a defendant must be allowed to
explore such questions during the impeachment of government witnesses. Id. at 318.
30. The jury selection process began on May 31, 1921, and the trial concluded on July 14,
1921. See 1-2 TRANSCRIPT, supra note 23. The prosecution offered 59 witnesses and the de-
fendants called 99. See FRANKFURTER, supra note 25, at 9.
31. Early in the trial for example, Judge Thayer declared:
I always allow the greatest possible latitude in these matters to both sides in order
that the jury may get all there is that is material upon all the issues involved in this
case. If I put up the bars on one side, then I must put them up on the other, and that
I dislike to [do] very much with either.
1 TRANSCRIPT, supra note 23, at 165.
32. See 2 TRANSCRIPT, supra note 23, at 1867-1961.
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avoid the military draft in 1917 by moving to Mexico with a number of
anarchist associates. The examination went as follows:
Q. [By Mr. Katzmann.] Did you say yesterday you love
a free country? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you love this country in the month of May, 1917?
A. I did not say,-I don't want to say I did not love this
country.
Q. Did you love this country in the month of [sic] 1917?
A. If you can, Mr. Katzmann, if you give me that,-I could
explain-
Q. Do you understand that question? A. Yes.
Q. Then will you please answer it? A. I can't answer in
one word.
Q. You can't say whether you loved the United States of
America one week before the day you enlisted for the first
draft? A. I can't say in one word, Mr. Katzmann.
Q. You can't tell this jury whether you loved the country
or not? Mr. Moore. I object to that.
A. I could explain that, yes, if I loved-
Q. What? A. I could explain that, yes, if I loved, if you
give me a chance.
Q. I ask you first to answer that question. Did you love
this United States of America in May, 1917? A. I can't an-
swer in one word.
Q. Did you love this country in the last week of May,
1917? A. That is pretty hard for me to say in one word, Mr.
Katzmann.
Q. There are two words you can use, Mr. Sacco, yes or
no. Which one is it? A. Yes.
Q. And in order to show your love for this United States
of America when she was about to call upon you to become a
soldier you ran away to Mexico? Mr. Jeremiah McAnarney.
Wait.
The Court. Did you?
Q. Did you run away to Mexico?
The Court. He has not said he ran away to Mexico. Did
you go?
April 1992]
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Q. Did you go to Mexico to avoid being a soldier for this
country that you loved? A. Yes.
Q. You still loved America, did you? A. I should say
yes.
Q. And is that your idea of showing your love for this
Country? A. [Witness hesitates.]
Q. Is that your idea of showing your love for America?
A. Yes.
Q. And would it be your idea of showing your love for
your wife that when she needed you you ran away from her?
A. I did not run away from her. Mr. Moore. I object.
The Witness. I was going to come after if I need her.
The Court. He may answer. Simply on the question of credi-
bility, that is all.
Q. Would it be your idea of love for your wife that you
were to run away from her when she needed you? Mr. Jer-
emiah McAnarney. Pardon me. I ask for an exception on that.
The Court. Excluded. One may not run away. He has
not admitted he ran away.
Q. Then I will ask you, didn't you run away from
Milford so as to avoid being a soldier for the United States?
A. I did not run away.
Q. You mean you walked away? A. Yes.
Q. You don't believe in war? A. No, sir.
Q. Do you think it is a cowardly thing to do what you
did? A. No.
Q. Do you think it is a brave thing to do what you did?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you think it would be a brave thing to go away
from your own wife? A. No.
Q. When she needed you? A. No.
Q. Why didn't you stay down in Mexico? A. Well, first
thing. I could not get my trade over there. I had to do any
other job.
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Q. Don't they work with a pick and shovel in Mexico?
A. Yes.
Q. Haven't you worked with a pick and shovel in this
country? A. I did.
Q. Why didn't you stay there, down there in that free
country, and work with a pick and shovel? A. I don't think I
did sacrifice to learn a job to go to pick and shovel in Mexico.
Q. Is it because,-is your love for the United States of
America commensurate with the amount of money you can get
in this country per week? A. Better conditions, yes.
Q. Better country to make money, isn't it? A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Sacco, that is the extent of your love for this
country, isn't it, measured in dollars and cents? Mr. Jeremiah
McAnarney. If your Honor please, I object to this particular
question.
The Court. You opened up this whole subject.
Mr. Jeremiah McAnarney. If your Honor please, I object
to this question. That is my objection.
The Court. The form of it?
Mr. Jeremiah McAnarney. To the substance and form.
Mr. Katzmann. I will change the form, if your Honor
please.
The Court. Better change that.
Q. Is your love for this country measured by the amount
of money you can earn here? Mr. Jeremiah McAnarney. To
that question I object.
The Court. Now, you may answer. A. I never loved
money.
Mr. Jeremiah McAnarney. Save my exception.
The Court. Certainly.
33
Thereafter the prosecutor explored, in great detail, Sacco's views about
Harvard University, as well as other cherished Massachusetts institu-
tions, 34 and delved into the defendant's reading habits, placing special
emphasis on the radical nature of the publications Sacco received.35
33. Id. at 1867-70.
34. Id. at 1879-81.
35. Id. at 1881-84.
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The truly extraordinary range of impeachment allowed the prosecu-
tion-as contrasted with that permitted the defendants-in the Sacco
and Vanzetti trial must be viewed as exceedingly troubling. The prosecu-
tion was permitted to parade the most prejudicial sorts of information
before a jury that, because of the times, was highly sensitive to issues
concerning military service and radical activity.36 At the same time, the
defendants were not even given an opportunity to explore a rather clear
source of potential bias. This disparity of treatment strongly suggests
that Judge Thayer was improperly biased against the defendants, a prop-
osition borne out by some of the judge's out-of-court remarks. 7
What a close analysis of the application of the rules of evidence does
is document the nature and extent of Judge Thayer's prejudice. It pro-
vides a window into the judge's mind and hard proof of his animosity
toward the defendants despite repeated protestations to the contrary. In
a world where benchmarks of fairness are hard to come by, where "spin
doctors" and public relations wizards are constantly at work, this is at
least a place to start in assessing actual human attitudes and the quality
of judicial conduct. Whether the system, especially courts of appeal,
choose to take notice of such information or not, it exists and can serve
an important role in informing us about the quality of the justice dis-
pensed in our courts.
The existence of an evidentiary code and espoused concern about its
enforcement has another salutary effect, as well. It almost inevitably
leads to the creation of a body of appellate decisions interpreting and
effectuating the evidentiary rules. The creation of such a body of prece-
dent places a significant burden on reviewing courts to act in conformity
with prior decisions. The web of precedent makes it difficult for those in
positions of appellate authority to ignore grave errors in the cases that
come before them. While elaborate excuses may be provided by appel-
late courts to justify aberrant behavior at trial, the difficulty of maintain-
ing such an approach for very long is quite clear.
Judges must eventually enforce the rules they claim govern their
conduct or face the clearest sort of proof of their dishonesty. The rule of
law is premised precisely upon this notion, that the web of rules, prece-
36. See FRANKFURTER, supra note 25, at 35-62; RUSSELL, TRAGEDY IN DEDHAM, supra
note 25, at 71-92.
37. Among those Judge Thayer is reported to have made prejudicial statements to were
the following individuals: Frank P. Sibley ("I'll show them that no long-haired anarchist from
California can run this court!"); Lois Rantoul, George U. Crocker, and Professor James P.
Richardson ("Did you see what I did with those anarchistic bastards the other day. I guess
that will hold them for a while. Let them go to the Supreme Court now and see what they can
get out of them."). See JOUGHIN & MORGAN, supra note 25, at 147-48.
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dents and procedures eventually ties the hands of those who would ma-
nipulate them for personal or class advantage.38 The evidentiary code is
among the strands that can bind the courts. In a setting where bias
threatens to overwhelm adjudicators, rules of evidence and the prece-
dents they generate provide some restraint.
In the Sacco and Vanzetti case the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court seemed to ignore precedent. In striving to uphold Judge Thayer's
rulings the court authorized the broadest imaginable impeachment.3 9
This decision was in conflict both with the court's prior rulings' and
evidentiary decisions from all over the United States.4 Creating a rule
sanctioning impeachment of the most wide-ranging scope, however, did
not solve all the appellate court's problems. The court still had to con-
front Judge Thayer's crabbed approach to the impeachment of Carlos
Goodridge. By upholding that determination,42 as well as those involv-
ing Sacco, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court embraced diamet-
rically opposed positions in the same case and left itself open to the most
withering sort of criticism. That criticism was delivered and the indefen-
sibility of the court's position laid bare in a Yale Law Journal Note that
declared:
But who can doubt that being a defendant in a criminal case to
the layman injures the character, and is under the logic of the
Sacco case admissible to injure it? And if this is true, is not a
plea of guilty to a charge of larceny at least as relevant to credi-
bility as a knowledge that "Harvard College educates more
boys of poor people free than any other university in the United
States of America"? . . . Whatever may be the case in other
jurisdictions, Massachusetts can hardly justify giving the nar-
rowest possible range to the shortest and simplest method of
impeachment, a conviction, and the widest possible range to the
most protracted and dangerous method, cross-examination to
an unconventional past.43
While these criticisms did not save Sacco and Vanzetti or result in
38. See EDWARD P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HuNTERs: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK
AcT 258-69 (1975).
39. See Commonwealth v. Sacco, 151 N.E. 839, 856 (Mass. 1926). My analysis of the
appellate court's failure is based upon the argument presented in Note, Cross-Examination to
Impeach, 36 YALE L.J. 384, 385 (1927).
40. See Sullivan v. O'Leary, 15 N.E. 775 (Mass. 1886); Note, supra note 39, at 385 n.5
(citing Commonwealth v. Homer, 127 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1920)).
41. See Note, supra note 39, at 387 n.1l.
42. See Sacco, 151 N.E. at 851.
43. See Note, supra note 39, at 388-90.
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the immediate restoration of fairness, they did serve as the groundwork
for challenges to the behavior of the appellate judges. Evidentiary rules
and precedents exposed the dubious nature of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court's position and made it vulnerable to the sort of
attack that could lead to the restoration of the rule of law.
III. RULES AND THE FIXING OF MINIMUM STANDARDS
OF DECENCY
The rules of evidence may also help establish minimum standards of
decency for the conducting of trials. While evidence law, as the Sacco
and Vanzetti case illustrates, is far from a clear and uniformly effective
barrier to improper adjudicatory behavior, the rules can and do provide
certain bright line distinctions about what ought to be viewed as just and
unjust procedure. Frequently, these lines have been drawn in response to
experiences in infamous cases that dramatize the consequences of uncon-
strained action. One of the clearest of these was the trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh in 1603 on a charge of high treason against James I.
Raleigh was said to have sought the overthrow of the King and his
replacement by Arabella Stuart.4 He was tried before a jury in a bruis-
ing prosecution conducted in the most ruthless manner by then Attorney
General Edward Coke. The key witness against Raleigh was an alleged
co-conspirator named Lord Cobham. Despite Raleigh's repeated de-
mands, Cobham, who was in the government's custody, was not pro-
duced and Sir Walter was tried on the basis of several of Cobham's out-
of-court statements.45 These were supported, albeit weakly, by the testi-
mony of a ship's pilot named Dyer who stated:
I came to a merchant's house in Lisbon, to see a boy that I
had there; there came a gentleman into the house, and enquir-
ing what countryman I was, I said, an Englishman. Where-
upon he asked me, if the king was crowned? And I answered,
No, but that I hoped he should be so shortly. Nay, saith he, he
shall never be crowned; for Don Raleigh and Don Cobham will
cut his throat ere that day come.46
Faced with such proofs Raleigh is said to have declared: "[I]f wit-
nesses are to speak by relation of one another, by this means you may
have any man's life in a week, and I may be massacred by mere hearsay
as Sir Nicholas Throckmorton was like to have been in Queen Mary's
44. Raleigh's Case, 2 St. Tr. 1, 1 (1603).
45. Id. at 10-27.
46. Id. at 25.
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time."'47 Raleigh's prediction proved all too accurate and despite being
able to produce a written recantation by Cobham, a" Sir Walter was con-
demned and executed.
The unfairness of the proceeding against Raleigh moved Englishmen
to address both their treason laws and the hearsay rule.4 9 Over the
course of the next century, during one of the most tumultuous periods in
English political history, rules restraining hearsay, at least in prominent
treason trials, were developed." They served as the foundation upon
which still wider application of the hearsay concept was undertaken and
minimum standards of decency established.5" The sort of protection ex-
tended through limitations on hearsay is far from a guarantee of fair and
decent trials but it does begin to hedge what the state may do in prose-
cuting its citizens. There is lasting value in the establishment of such
limits.
IV. EVIDENCE RULES AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
In the preceding parts of this commentary it was my objective to
describe the value of rules of evidence in situations involving the most
dire threats of injustice. In the less highly charged everyday life of the
courts the rules also play an important part. As delineated by Jeremy
Bentham almost two hundred years ago, exclusionary rules of evidence
"are at once the engines of [the lawyers'] power, and the foundation of
his claim to the reputation of superior wisdom, ahd recondite science.""
Bentham saw this effect of the rules as an unwholesome curtailment of
courtroom access to information. I disagree and see it as one of the fun-
damental checks on the judiciary, providing advocates with a means of
cabining the power of judges and reinforcing the adversarial nature of
courtroom proceedings.
Rules of evidence place power in lawyers' hands. That power is real
and effective in all but those cases where judges are willing to overtly
47. 9 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 445 (3d ed. 1944).
48. Raleigh's Case, 2 St. Tr. at 28-29.
49. See RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO
EVIDENCE 349 (2d ed. 1983).
50. See WILLIAM NELSON, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 231-32 (1717) (attributing most hear-
say rulings cited in his treatise to judges responding to evidentiary issues arising in series of
treason cases referred to as Popish Plot prosecutions).
51. See Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in
Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 564-72 (1990) (hearsay doctrine not
often invoked in routine felony proceedings in Old Bailey until 1730s and did not become
regular part of proceedings until sometime after mid-century).
52. 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 48 (Garland Publishing
1978) (1827).
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manipulate the process to serve their strongest prejudices. The rules give
lawyers a substantial say in what proofs may and may not be admitted at
trial. This power restrains the judge's authority to pursue his or her own
interests or seize control of the case. It reinforces the adversaries' control
over the gathering and offering of testimony. While the system of checks
and balances established by the evidence rules is not always obeyed, it
does help to create the adversarial context in which our system operates.
The division of power arranged by the rules works because of
America's continuing reliance on lay juries. Together, lawyers empow-
ered by the rules of evidence and jurors vested with the final say about
the facts can form a substantial barrier to judicial hegemony. This ar-
rangement helps preserve democratic participation in the judicial system
as well as an adversarial way of doing business. It provides a tangible
restraint on the power of government. As William Garrow, a celebrated
courtroom advocate of the late eighteenth century,13 put it while arguing
a case in the Old Bailey in 1787: "The King cannot break down, or
infringe, or invade any one of the rules of evidence; he has no prerogative
to say that innocence shall not be protected."54 The rules of evidence do
matter. Both in extreme situations and everyday practice they serve a
vital function in keeping the system fair and power balanced.
53. For a brief discussion of Garrow's career, see Landsman, supra note 51, at 551-64.
54. Reilly's Case, OLD BAILEY SESSION PAPERS, Sept. 1787, at 1073.
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